Monitoring and Reviewing Wenger Part 3 of Management Survey

This is the third and final part of Neil Fry's management review:Monsieur Wenger can boast an impressively consistent record of finishing in the top four of the Premier League in all of the 14 seasons he has been in charge.  A confusing pattern has, however, also emerged regarding targets and objective setting during recent years.  Monsieur Wenger has repeatedly stated that the targets were trophy success and the Premier and Champions League were realisable priorities.  Indeed, in the last season as Arsenal remained the only Big Four club, temporarily, in contention for all four competitions and Monsieur Wenger stated that he believed that his playing staff were sufficiently equipped to win all of them. 

_{When it became apparent that this would be the sixth successive season without becoming Premier League  Champions, Mr Wenger appeared to change the target retrospectively and suggest that second place (unattained in the last five seasons) would equate to success, “I would sign up right now for second place for the next 20 years.”  In addition, having enhanced its level of prioritisation then failed to win it, Monsieur Wenger declared the League Cup “not an actual trophy”.}

_{Indeed, Monsieur Wenger has made a number of statements that appear completely at odds with all the evidence presented.   His analysis that “this is my best squad ever” seems extraordinary and the player competencies of all but a few members of the squad, appeared very obviously vastly inferior to that of The Invincibles to all others interested in the game.  In marked contrast to key rivals, Monsieur Wenger, felt the need to repeat a key message that “this team has unbelievable mental strength” – when they have clearly demonstrated a serious and consistent group fragility over a succession of seasons.  Indeed, Monsieur Wenger himself stated that it would “kill” players such as Messrs Dennilson and Song if he signed experienced players that would compete for their positions.} 

_{The management and Board’s monitoring and reviewing of the stated objectives at the club appears to have been carried out on an ad-hoc and verbal basis and the findings, have repeatedly been inconsistent with the evidence presented.  For instance, last season, Mr Gazidis, Chief Executive Officer statement that the financial management of the club has demonstrated “tremendous efficiency” is questionable for the reasons previously stated.} 

_{No evidence was found to suggest that there has been any top-level strategic review at Arsenal of the performance of Monsieur Wenger and / or his coaching staff or consideration of identifying changes or further support or alternatives.   No records of annual performance standard or benchmark setting were found in respect of expected seasonal outcomes.  Similarly, verbal expressions of what was perceived as satisfactory seasonal outcomes were imprecise and infrequent.} 

_{Indeed, the most significant comments, in reviewing the team’s lack of substantive success, came from Club Captain Senor Fabregas.  He stated that, “for me it’s more a lack of a winning mentality, also of maturity in key moments.” He also contrasted the squad to that of The Invincibles, “We are missing the ability to say: ‘now I know what it is to win and I know what it takes to win’.  That’s what made [that] Arsenal team so strong, they knew how to win games, when to dig in, when to attack, they had a special intelligence to read games.  Now we are very young.”  He also stated that the repeated failings to win a trophy would not be tolerated elsewhere.  “It’s different here … the club values other things … that the team is always in the Champions League … bring through young players, economic stability.”  However, he added, “I imagine there will be a moment when you have to take the plunge … either you win or you don’t win.”}

_{Key rivals have, however, been ruthless in monitoring players and management performances and reacting accordingly.  For instance, despite winning last season’s Premier League Mr Ferguson was quick to bring in substantial reinforcements to address concerns over away form and player retirements.  Chelsea dismissed their manager, who won the much coveted Double of Premier League and FA Cup the previous season, and then came second in the Premier League, for poor performance.  Liverpool changed both ownership and manager mid-season and spent considerable sums on player recruitment – initial indications suggest wisely.}

_{Little evidence was detected of any ability to learn from experience, rather similar failings appear to have been repeated over the last six seasons which culminated in the same, trophy-less, outcomes.   No evidence was found of identifying appropriate remedial actions and prioritising them.  For instance, despite Monsieur Wenger identifying the need to recruit some experienced players, particularly an experienced and robust central defender, there is no evidence to suggest any prioritisation programme or action plan has been implemented in this regard.  Rather, at the time of finishing this report, the player recruitment policy appeared to remain unchanged as familiar spending patterns have continued - even in light of Monsieur Wenger’s own anecdotal verbal review of last season’s defensive failings or since the significant change in ownership.  The spending outcomes immediately prior to the season starting was under £1m on Mr Jenkinson, a 19 year old full-back who started 8 league games for Charlton Athletic last season, £11m on Gevinho, a French League Ivory Coast born offensive player; (£10m on) Master Oxlade-Chamberlain, an offensive player; and approximately £10m on Mr Campbell a 19 year old Costa Rican offensive player.}

_{Monsieur Wenger’s assertion that everyone was playing their cards ‘close to their chests’ appeared contrary to all the available evidence of the high spending and changes at key rivals.  Manchester United and Liverpool spent relatively heavily on players and Chelsea prioritised the recruitment of a new manager and paid a hitherto unrecognised sum in compensation to his former employers to obtain his services.}

_Conclusion

 _{The available evidence suggests that the most significant cause of Arsenal’s failure to win any trophy for the last six seasons appears to be the major change in the previously highly successful player recruitment policy – exacerbated by inexperience and un-remedied lack of key competences in defensive players recruited and defensive coaching.  That is not to say that such a policy was inherently flawed – given Monsieur Wenger’s acknowledged flair and success in recruiting and coaching offensive players.  Rather, one or two timely additions of well selected, and not necessarily prohibitively costly, experienced, defensive players should have remedied the problems.  This may have led to the desired success – and even have provided financial benefits that far exceeded their additional cost.   This has been exacerbated by some disastrous unintended consequences regarding the trophy prioritisation policy.  A confused and incoherent implementation of club’s financial strategy was also apparent, with financial inconsistencies and missed opportunities on and off the pitch.  Moreover, the club appears to have been very slow to adapt to developments elsewhere - whereas key Premier League rivals have been much quicker and more flexible in responding to events.  Rather, despite the on-going lack of trophy success, Monsieur Wenger appears to have become increasingly resistant to change his policies.} 

_{The most serious deficiencies found were in monitoring and reviewing progress against verbally declared objectives and then learning from it.  There has been a repeated failure to take significant action over obvious failings – let alone prioritise the necessary remedial actions.  The situation has remained despite the very significant change in club ownership.  Whilst the self-sustainability model was, eventually, deemed inadequate, both on the pitch and in terms of club pricing to supporters, that model is still very much in evidence.  Indeed, director leadership has appeared to remain largely absent, both before and since the ownership change.  Performance objectives, targets and standards have not been made clear.  Rather, there appears an inordinate level of faith in Monsieur Wenger regardless of on the pitch outcomes.  Indeed, Monsieur Wenger appears to enjoy an unprecedented level of trust and power to do as he feels fit and does not appear be subject to any real accountability within the club over failing to achieve substantive success during his second 7 year period.}   

_{The immediate future appears to represent a particularly hazardous period for the Club.  With the recent foreign investment into Manchester City paying immediate dividends, and recent changes of ownership and management and player recruitment investment at Liverpool, the Big Four may now be considered the ‘Big Five’.  Or, in a worst case scenario, a ‘Big Four’ could remain with the expulsion of Arsenal from the group.  There is grave concern amongst many supporters and the pre-season has not augured well.  Match performances and results have been poor and major previously identified failings again repeated (and opportunities to bed in new players missed).}

  _{The difficulties are compounded by a high risk August start to the season with matches against key rivals and a difficult two legged European Champions League qualifying match that they must win to merely compete in the early league stages – a situation hampered by injuries and suspensions to other key personnel.  Moreover, the prospects of Arsenal are unlikely to be enhanced by the expected imminent departure of two star players soon after the commencement of the new season – to try and realise their personal ambitions of success (Written before Fabregas and Nasri left).}

_{Return to Part 1}