Review Pt 4 Same Old Failed Assurances and Wage Structure

The final section of the mid-season review examines the progression, or otherwise, of previously identified problem areas at the Club and, also, considers further issues.Matters of Evident Concern1.  Player recruitment policy – wage spendPre-season, the Chief Executive stated that Monsieur Wenger’s socialist wage structure needed to be adjusted.   Around the turn of the year, however, Monsieur Wenger affirmed his personal commitment to the socialist model and the support of the Board over such pay bands.  Eschewed by rivals, the model is probably unique in the professional game.

With little hope of the trophy success their talents deserve, top players remain having to effectively subsidise the lavish lifestyles of significantly under-performing but over-paid fringe players or discarded major signings who make no contribution to the Club.  The problem appears to be further exacerbated by the reluctance of the Club to sign necessary replacements until they are off the Club’s books.  The outcome is that, remarkably, very much more successful and ambitious clubs at home and abroad actually spend around the same or less on players wages than Arsenal.  The continuance of such an inefficient and counter-intuitive wage spend raises serious questions both about the judgment of Monsieur Wenger and the competence of the Board.

2.  Monitoring and acting

Whatever Mr Bould’s permitted role, in the absence of any significant evidence, defensive failings remained un-remedied.  Similarly failings in leadership, a concept Monsieur Wenger has counter-intuitively continued to downplay, continue. After admitting that the team’s inconsistency was such that he changed his mind about whether he needed to enter the transfer market from game to game, Monsieur Wenger came to another counter-intuitive conclusion that his squad was top, top level. Beyond Mr Monreal’s emergency, last day of the January transfer market signing, once again, clearly necessary defensive re-inforcements were again rejected.  Not least, going a whole season without one recognised defensive midfield player in the entire squad.  Monsieur Wenger’s counter-intuitive refusal to accept clear medical evidence, once again went unrewarded.  Once again there was an early calendar year crisis due to defensive injuries that went uncorrected.  For, once again, there was a demonstrable lack of the necessary corrective action in the January transfer window.  The continuance of such ongoing failures to monitor operations and take the necessary effective remedial action raises further questions about the judgment of Monsieur Wenger and the competence of the Board.

3.  Risk management

The Chief Executive’s assertion that the Club took proportionate risks as part of the strategic business model continues to be contradicted by the evidence.  In addition to the unnecessary risks caused by the long list of the un-corrected issues noted in the previous section, the failures over renewing Mr Walcott’s contract represented yet another totally unnecessary risk. 

Whether the other members of the British core remain as loyal in the face of the enhanced salaries of more ambitious and successful meritocracies remains to be seen.   For the attempt to remedy failures of player loyalty by the development of a new British core is another risk, not substantiated by the previous evidence.  Rather, the underlying cause of poor policies and strategies leading to a sustained lack of trophy success have been ignored and a counter-intuitive link between foreignness and restlessness preferred.  The repeated great reluctance to sign established and successful Premier League players, of any nationality, is another unnecessary risk.  The continued propensity to take unnecessary and disproportionate risks raises further questions about the judgment of Monsieur Wenger and the competence of the Board.

4.  Financial matters

The Club’s frequent assertions of financial prudence continues to be contradicted by the evidence.  As the considerable economic benefits from trophy success continue to disappear, the various inefficiencies of the socialist wage spend mount.  The excessive supporter pricing continues, albeit capped, despite the lack of trophy success which rival supporters enjoy.  In the first period of Monsieur Wenger’s reign, he appeared very adroit at selling top players when they had appeared to have passed their prime, now - despite the ownership of Mr Kroenke - Arsenal seem content to sell star players at their peak.  This is exacerbated by the lack of transfer spending from cash reserves.  Indeed, the business model’s heavy reliance on player sales has continued and with it Arsenal’s new feeder club status with further recent player sales.  Indeed, at the time of publication, Arsenal announced their half-yearly accounts covering the six months up to the end of Nov 2012.  A significantly reduced profit of £17.8 million was generated by transfers  and,  effectively,  the £24 million sale of Mr van Persie to Manchester United.[39]  The continuance of such financial policies further questions the judgment of Monsieur Wenger, the competence of the Board, and the role of Mr Kroenke. 

5.  Benchmark / Target setting

The Board have continued to assure supporters that Monsieur Wenger’s autonomy over footballing operations and policies have their full, and future, support.  The available evidence continues to suggest that Premier League 4^th place and Champions League qualification appears to remain the Club’s informal and unstated benchmark.  Thereafter the historically confusing pattern of targets and objective setting has been exacerbated as the chaotic and inconsistent season unfolded.  Monsieur Wenger completely dismissed the importance of the League Cup before and after the calamitous Final defeat to the soon to be relegated Birmingham.

 Yet, following the de facto reserve team success at Reading, the first team was fielded in the next round’s shock defeat at fourth tier Bradford. The disastrous Premier League campaign lead to a much weakened team throwing away a comfortable knockout stage draw in the Champions League, the longstanding apparent priority, despite seasons of falling a very long way short. Having again acknowledged the benefits of winning a domestic trophy on building wider success, a much weakened team lost at home to second tier Blackburn in the relatively winnable FA Cup.   Subsequently Arsenal’s capacity to beat Europe’s best clubs appeared even more highly questionable.  The continuance of on-going failures in benchmarking and target setting raise further questions about the judgment of Monsieur Wenger and the competence of the Board.

6.  Monsieur Wenger

Since the extraordinary success of the revolutionary first period of his long reign as manager of Arsenal, eight to sixteen years ago, supporters appear to be growing ever more unconvinced by Monsieur Wenger’s capacity to revisit such successes.  It is not the role of the auditor, however, to recommend the dismissal of individuals when they are following policies which have the full support of their line management and Board.  This is particularly the case when they have been told by such that they are regarded as a high performer and that nothing they are doing is in need of corrective action.  In considerably more successful times - despite a number of suitors – Monsieur Wenger always honoured his contract and it appears highly unlikely that the Club would dismiss him with little over one year left of his present one.

Nevertheless, modern sport from rival managers in football, to Dave Brailsford’s management of the Sky cycling team, to the management of Team GB in the 2012 Olympics, have demonstrated that a seemingly obsessive pursuit of detail to gain small competitive edges to winning effect in very competitive environments is crucial.  Monsieur Wenger, however, has railed against such approaches and seems to prefer to cede opponents a number of advantages by keeping faith with many seemingly counter-intuitive longstanding beliefs.  These include the commitment to a socialist anti-meritocracy wage structure, a refusal to trust in the fresh approaches of up and coming coaching talent, a refusal to prioritise defensive strength and player leadership, a refusal to sign established and successful Premier League players, and a refusal to adopt the sophisticated intelligence operations and tactical approaches of rivals to neutralise the opposition. 

This has been compounded by the Club’s willingness to sell its top players, replace them with lower cost and lower quality players and bank the profits.  This is further exacerbated by on going, and very significant, failures of the current management team over contract negotiations and scouting operations – matters for which Monsieur Wenger also bears considerable responsibility. 

7.  Management succession

The Chief Executive has assured supporters that they are aware of a need for succession planning and that Monsieur Wenger’s ‘DNA’ must not be lost once he does decide to go.  However, a number of important genes appear to be missing from the Club’s structure and it is difficult to imagine any top quality successor being satisfied with a policy of selling the top players for profit or the Club’s current coaching and surveillance structures (or absence of them), scouting network and contracts management arrangements.  Furthermore, Monsieur Wenger has refused to indicate whether he has any intention of accepting the Board’s new contract offer.  Yet he remains deferred to and has been allowed to recently sign a British core on long contracts (despite the identified risks) and there are also indications that there will be substantial contracts offered to new signings in the summer.  The concern is that a potential successor one year later may be handed a legacy of some very expensive and unwanted baggage.

8.  Composition of Board

Following the disastrous cup defeats, fourth place Premier League Champions League qualification appears all that remains.  The evidence suggests this is the owner and Board’s benchmark of success – despite the considerable unlikely-hood that the competition could ever be won under their leadership.  Many supporters fear that local rivals Tottenham, having retained their own star player and talisman Gareth Bale, will not repeat last season’s capitulation and will edge Arsenal out of even that.  Such an eventuality will represent the loss this season of yet another of Monsieur Wenger’s impressive historical records as his powers in the modern game appear to continue to diminish. 

 The owner and Board do not accept this and have indicated that such a failure would be quite acceptable and they would still be happy to renew Monsieur Wenger’s contract if he would like one.  Their absolute deference to and faith in Monsieur Wenger and the direction of the Club appear undiminished.  Mr Kroenke’s reluctance to meddle in footballing operations is admirable enough – particularly compared to other prominent owners.  But his lack of leadership, his absenteeism and refusal to engage with supporters and explain why he chose to purchase the club and his long term ambitions, and his faith in the current senior management and Board can no longer be justified.

 Similarly, the refusal to allow Mr Dein and Mr Usamov a much needed presence on the Board.  The ongoing lack of footballing expertise on the Board was highlighted by Bayern’s travelling party.  In marked contrast, they have former legends and international stars Karl-Heinz Rummenigge and Uli Hoeness as their chief executive and President and Matthias Sammer on the Board.  Instead, at Arsenal, there is a complacent refusal to refresh the Board in the name of unity.  Their willingness to accept the status quo, even when it is clearly unacceptable, remains ever more obvious.  Despite an even more catastrophic season than the last, and against all available evidence, they remain confident they will soon be able to compete with the likes of the Manchester clubs, Chelsea, Bayern, and Barcelona.  They gave the same, failed, assurances over the stadium re-location and they appear even more unfounded now. 

Parts 1, 2 and 3 can be found on links at very bottom of this web page.

References

[39] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/arsenal/9894367/Arsenal-chairman-Peter-Hill-Wood-says-profits-will-be-used-to-strenghten-club.htm